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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
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MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 The United States commenced an action under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, U.S.C. §§ 
1101 et seq., against Johann Breyer, seeking his denaturalization 
based on his service as an armed guard in Nazi concentration 
camps during World War II.  Breyer's naturalization was premised 
on his 1952 entry into the United States as a displaced person 
under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 
Stat. 1009, amended by Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (1950).  
Although Breyer essentially conceded that he was ineligible for 
displaced persons status as a result of his wartime activities, 
he challenged the government's right to denaturalize him, 
asserting that in retrospect, he should be deemed to have entered 
this country in 1952 lawfully as a United States citizen, having 
derived citizenship through his mother.  The district court 
granted summary judgment in the government's favor, which served 
to denaturalize Breyer.  Nonetheless, the court determined that 
the derivative citizenship statute in effect at the time of 
Breyer's birth, which awarded citizenship only to persons born to 
United States citizen fathers, was unconstitutional, but 
abstained from declaring Breyer a United States citizen because 
of a pending administrative proceeding he had initiated for this 
  
purpose.  The issues we address are whether Breyer was properly 
denaturalized and whether the district court should have reached 
Breyer's derivative citizenship claim. 
 
 I. 
 The material facts surrounding Breyer's entry into the 
United States and subsequent naturalization are not in dispute.  
Breyer was born on May 30, 1925, in Neuwalddorf, now known as 
Nova Lesna in the Republic of Slovakia.  As a young man, he 
joined the Waffen SS, a Nazi paramilitary group, and ultimately 
became a member of the SS Totenkopfsturmbanne (Death's Head) 
Battalion.  The SS Totenkopfsturmbanne was responsible for 
guarding Nazi concentration camps, where people were forcibly 
confined in inhumane conditions, subjected to unspeakable 
atrocities and executed because of their race, religion, national 
origin or political beliefs.    
          Breyer was initially assigned to the Buchenwald 
concentration camp where he served in the SS Totenkopf guard unit 
from February, 1943 to May, 1944.  At Buchenwald, Breyer was 
trained to use a rifle and guard prisoners.  In uniform, Breyer 
accompanied prisoners to and from work sites, and stood guard 
with a loaded rifle at the perimeter of the camp, under orders to 
shoot any prisoner trying to escape who failed to heed a warning 
to stop.  In May, 1944, Breyer was transferred to Auschwitz, a 
death camp complex established in Nazi-occupied Poland.  Again 
uniformed as an SS Totenkopf guard and armed with a rifle, Breyer 
patrolled the camp's perimeters and escorted prisoners to and 
  
from work.  In August, 1944, Breyer took a paid leave, never to 
return to guard duty.  While Breyer denied that he personally 
engaged in any abuse of prisoners, he was aware that prisoners 
were tortured and killed at Buchenwald and Auschwitz.   
  In May, 1951, Breyer applied to the United States 
Displaced Persons Commission to be qualified as a displaced 
person under the Displaced Persons Act for purposes of obtaining 
a visa to immigrate to the United States.  His application was 
initially rejected because he had served in the Waffen SS.  
Several months later, the criteria for eligibility under the Act 
changed, so that membership in the Waffen SS was no longer a bar 
to displaced person status.  In an interview with the Commission, 
Breyer disclosed that he was a member of the Waffen SS, but did 
not disclose his membership in the SS Totenkopf.  On March 28, 
1952, the Commission certified Breyer as a displaced person 
eligible for a visa.   
 Breyer then applied to immigrate to the United States 
as an alien under the Act.  He was granted an immigrant visa and 
entered the United States in May, 1952.  Thereafter, Breyer filed 
a petition for naturalization and on November 7, 1957, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
granted his petition and issued a certificate of naturalization. 
 On April 21, 1992, the government filed a five-count 
complaint under section 1451(a) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act to revoke and set aside Breyer's naturalized 
United States citizenship on the grounds that it was illegally 
procured (Counts I, II, III, IV) or was procured by concealment 
  
or willful misrepresentation (Count V).1  In an amendment to his 
answer, Breyer set forth as an "affirmative defense" the 
allegation that he was a derivative citizen of the United States.  
Breyer asserted that his citizenship was derived from his mother, 
who he alleged was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.2 
                     
1
.   Section 1451(a) states in pertinent part: 
 
 § 1451. Revocation of naturalization 
  
 (a)  Concealment of material evidence; refusal to 
testify 
 
 It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys for 
the respective districts, upon affidavit showing good 
cause therefor, to institute proceedings in any 
district court of the United States . . . for the 
purpose of revoking and setting aside the order 
admitting such person to citizenship and canceling the 
certificate of naturalization on the ground that such 
order and certificate of naturalization were illegally 
procured or were procured by concealment of a material 
fact or by willful misrepresentation . . . . 
2
.   United States citizenship is acquired under the United 
States Constitution or by federal statute.  Persons born in the 
United States are automatically citizens under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Alternatively, a person may have a statutory right to 
United States derivative citizenship through certain familial 
relationships.  The applicable statute has been revised over the 
years.  When Breyer was born, section 1993 of the Revised Statute 
of 1874 granted United States citizenship to foreign-born 
offspring of United States citizen fathers, but not of United 
States citizen mothers.  Section 1993 was amended in 1934 to make 
it gender neutral, and thereafter, it was repealed and replaced.  
Presently, derivative citizenship is granted to all foreign-born 
children of either American citizen parent.  8 U.S.C. § 1401.   
 
 In October, 1994, Congress enacted legislation which 
amends 8 U.S.C. § 1401 to eliminate retroactively the gender 
distinction in section 1993.  Under the amendment, persons born 
abroad before noon May 24, 1934 to a United States citizen mother 
obtain citizenship.  Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305 (1994).  
The amendment also provides that the retroactive application of 
the amendment shall not confer citizenship upon any person who 
was ineligible for admission into the United States under the 
  
 On October 30, 1992, pursuant to section 1452(a), 
Breyer filed an Application for Certificate of Citizenship with 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, claiming derivative 
citizenship through his mother,3 which is pending at the time of 
this appeal. 
 In December, 1992, the government filed a motion for 
summary judgment on Count I (Illegal Procurement of U.S. 
Citizenship: Unlawful Admission under the Displaced Persons Act, 
Assistance in Persecution) and Count II (Illegal Procurement of 
U.S. Citizenship: Unlawful Admission under the Displaced Persons 
Act, Membership In Hostile Movement).  Attacking the lawfulness 
of Breyer's 1952 entry, the government contended that Breyer was 
excluded under the Displaced Persons Act from obtaining a visa 
because of his SS Totenkopf guard service at Buchenwald and 
Auschwitz.  Since he was ineligible under the Act, the visa with 
which he entered this country was invalid.  Without a valid visa, 
his entry was unlawful, and his naturalization, in turn, was 
illegally procured.  
 Breyer's primary response to the government's motion 
was his claim of derivative citizenship.  According to Breyer, 
(..continued) 
Displaced Persons Act or affect the validity of a 
denaturalization action against any such person.  Id.  Since this 
legislation is not before us, we make no comment upon it.   
3
.   The Service is authorized to issue evidence of 
derivative citizenship in the form of a Certificate of 
Citizenship to persons who claim statutory derivative 
citizenship.  8 U.S.C. § 1452(a); 8 C.F.R. § 341.1-.7 (1994).  
The statutory procedure that persons with derivative citizenship 
claims must follow is discussed on pp. 17-18, supra. 
  
since he was a United States citizen through his mother at the 
time of his 1952 entry, he entered the United States lawfully, 
and thus, his naturalization was meaningless and not the means by 
which he was entitled to citizenship. 
          On March 30, 1993, Breyer filed a motion to stay before 
the district court, requesting that the government's 
denaturalization action be stayed pending final resolution of his 
derivative citizenship claim under consideration before the 
Service.  The court denied Breyer's motion on April 20, 1993.  
          On July 7, 1993, the district court issued an opinion 
and order on the government's summary judgment motion in which it 
analyzed the government's request for summary judgment and 
Breyer's derivative citizenship defense separately.  United 
States v. Breyer, 829 F. Supp. 773 (E.D. Pa. 1993).  The district 
court found, as the government asserted, that Breyer's 
concentration camp guard service was a bar to eligibility under 
the Displaced Persons Act, rendering his visa invalid and his 
entry unlawful, and concluded that Breyer's naturalization was 
illegally procured.  
 The district court then turned to the merits of 
Breyer's derivative citizenship claim, specifically whether 
section 1993 of the Revised Statute of 1874 violated Breyer's 
Fifth Amendment equal protection rights since at the time of 
Breyer's birth, the statute awarded citizenship to foreign-born 
offspring of United States citizen fathers but not of United 
States citizen mothers.  The district court found section 1993 
unconstitutional as applied to Breyer, but deferred a ruling on 
  
the appropriate remedy pending the outcome of a bench trial on 
the disputed issue of Breyer's mother's birthplace.  The district 
court's July 7, 1993 order granted the government's motion for 
summary judgment on Counts I and II, without prejudice to 
Breyer's right to pursue the issue of derivative United States 
citizenship as an affirmative defense.  The government 
subsequently withdrew the other counts of the complaint.  
 After a bench trial to determine Breyer's mother's 
birthplace, the district court rendered a second opinion and 
order on December 21, 1993.  United States v. Breyer, 841 F. 
Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa. 1993).  The district court found that 
Breyer's mother was indeed born in the United States, and 
concluded that the remedy for the unconstitutionality of section 
1993 is to include United States mothers under the statute 
retroactively.  Nonetheless, because the district court also 
concluded that a party must exhaust administrative remedies 
before a federal court could issue a declaration of citizenship, 
it "abstained" from resolving the issue of Breyer's derivative 
citizenship to enable him to pursue to conclusion the 
administrative proceeding he had initiated before the Service.  
Accordingly, in its December 21, 1993 order, because the 
government had prevailed on summary judgment, the district court 
declared that Breyer procured his certificate of naturalization 
illegally,4 set aside the order admitting Breyer to United States 
                     
4
.   Even though the government withdrew Counts III, IV and 
V of the complaint, the district court also found that Breyer 
procured his certificate of naturalization by "willful 
concealment and misrepresentation of material facts".  In a post-
  
citizenship, canceled his certificate of naturalization and 
demanded its surrender, and declared that Breyer's right to 
pursue his derivative citizenship claim through the appropriate 
channels was not prejudiced.5 
 On December 29, 1993, Breyer filed a motion for relief 
from judgment and a motion to alter or amend judgment, which 
requested essentially that the district court vacate its prior 
orders.6  Breyer's post-trial motions were denied on January 20, 
(..continued) 
trial motion, Breyer requested that these words be stricken from 
the court's December 21, 1993 order.  In a January 24, 1994 
order, the district court granted Breyer's request, striking the 
words from its prior order as "superfluous".  On appeal, Breyer 
contends that the district court should have stricken the 
language as "incorrect".  We interpret the district court's use 
of the word "superfluous" in this context to mean unnecessary and 
invalid, and to provide Breyer essentially with the relief he 
sought.  Thus, we find that the district court did not err in the 
language it used to modify its December 21, 1993 order. 
5
.   Although the court used the term "abstain", its 
December 21, 1993 order was conclusive and the case was closed on 
December 23, 1993.  Therefore, the district court's December 21, 
1993 order was final for purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. 
6
.   As Breyer's December 29, 1993 motions asked the 
district court to vacate its prior orders, both will be viewed as 
Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend the judgment, even though 
one was styled a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment.  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, 60; Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp. v. Nowalk, 420 
F.2d 858, 859 (3d Cir. 1970).  A timely appeal from a denial of a 
Rule 59 motion "`brings up the underlying judgment for review.'"  
Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 
1986), quoting Quality Prefabrication, Inc. v. Daniel J. Keating 
Co., 675 F.2d 77, 78 (3d Cir. 1982).  Therefore, our standard of 
review for a denial of a Rule 59 motion varies with the 
underlying judicial decision.  Federal Kemper, 807 F.2d at 348.  
Here, it is the underlying summary judgment in favor of the 
government, upon which the revocation of Breyer's naturalized 
citizenship was premised, that we review.  Moreover, the issues 
Breyer raises on appeal relate to those determined by the 
district court's grant of summary judgment. 
  




          In our review of this case, we remain mindful of two 
competing concerns.  On the one hand, we acknowledge that "the 
right to acquire United States citizenship is a precious one, and 
that once citizenship has been acquired, its loss can have severe 
and unsettling consequences."  Fedorenko v. United States, 449 
U.S. 490, 505 (1981).  For this reason, the government "`carries 
a heavy burden of proof in a proceeding to divest a naturalized 
citizen of his citizenship'", Id., quoting Costello v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 265, 269 (1961), and the evidence for revocation 
must be "`clear, unequivocal, and convincing'" and not leave 
"`the issue in doubt.'"  Id., quoting Schneiderman v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943) and Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 121 
U.S. 325, 381 (1887).  On the other hand, we recognize that there 
must be "strict compliance" with all the congressionally imposed 
prerequisites to naturalization, and failure to comply with any 
of these terms renders the naturalization illegally procured and 
subject to revocation under section 1451(a) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act.  Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506.  Even though 
Breyer does not specifically challenge the district court's 
conclusion that he was ineligible for a visa and entry into this 
                     
7
.   Breyer's post-trial motions were denied, except that 
the district court struck certain language from its December 21, 
1993 order.  See n. 4, supra. 
  
country under the Displaced Persons Act, the importance of the 
fundamental right that is at stake in a denaturalization 
proceeding requires our in-depth examination of the record to 
make certain that the government met its stringent burden. 
 
 A. 
          The Immigration and Nationality Act provides, inter 
alia, that no person shall be naturalized unless the applicant 
has resided continuously within the United States, after having 
been lawfully admitted for permanent residence, for at least five 
years.  8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1).  Lawful admission requires entry 
pursuant to a valid immigrant visa.  Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 515; 
United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488, 492-93 (3d Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986).     
          The Displaced Persons Act was specially enacted in 1948 
to accommodate the large number of refugees wishing to emigrate 
to the United States following World War II.  Under the Act, 
those eligible as displaced persons were granted entrance visas.  
In section 13 of the Act, however, there were notable exclusions 
from eligibility for a visa, two of which the government alleged 
and the district court found were applicable to Breyer.  Section 
13 states in pertinent part: 
 No visas shall be issued under the provisions 
of this Act, as amended . . . to any person 
who is or has been a member of or participant 
in any movement which is or has been hostile 
to the United States or the form of 
government of the United States, or to any 
person who advocated or assisted in the 
persecution of any person because of race, 
religion or national origin. 
  
 
64 Stat. 219, 227. 
 
 Since Breyer entered the country with a visa obtained 
under the Displaced Persons Act, the legality of Breyer's 
naturalization ultimately turns on his eligibility under that 
Act.  Therefore, we begin with the district court's application 
of the Act's exclusionary provisions to Breyer.   
 In Fedorenko v. United States, the Supreme Court 
addressed the meaning of the Act's "assistance in persecution" 
exclusion in a denaturalization case of an Nazi concentration 
camp guard.8  The Court clarified that this exclusion does not 
require willing and personal participation in atrocities, and 
drew a continuum of conduct to guide the courts in deciding what 
behavior it covers.  Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512.  According to 
the Court, while at one extreme is the individual who cut a 
female prisoner's hair before execution and should not be viewed 
as having assisted in persecution, at the other extreme is the 
                     
8
.   Fedorenko was decided under section 10 of the Act which 
requires a misrepresentation of a material fact before 
ineligibility may attach.  By contrast, under section 13, a 
person may be ineligible simply because he falls within an 
excludable category of persons. 
 
 Under the Act in effect when Fedorenko applied for a 
visa, section 2 incorporated by reference an "assistance in 
persecution" exclusion found in the International Refugee 
Organization Constitution.  This exclusion denied eligibility to 
those who "assisted the enemy in persecuting civil[ians]" or had 
"voluntarily assisted the enemy forces . . . in their 
operations. . . ."  Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495, n.4.  In 1950, 
Congress amended section 13 to create an explicit bar within the 
Act itself against those who assisted in persecution.  64 Stat. 
219, 227 (June 16, 1950). 
  
armed, uniformed, paid guard who having shot a fleeing prisoner 
would fit within the exclusion.  Id. at n.34.  In light of this 
standard, the Court held that Fedorenko's service as a guard on 
the perimeters of the Nazi concentration camp at Treblinka in 
Poland -- whether voluntary or involuntary -- constituted 
"assistance in persecution" under the Displaced Persons Act.  Id. 
at 512. 
          In the wake of Fedorenko, other courts have determined 
that concentration camp guard service in circumstances similar to 
those presented here qualifies as assistance in persecution 
within the meaning of the Act.  United States v. Schmidt, 923 
F.2d 1253, 1259 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 
331 (1991) (member of Death's Head Battalion who served as an 
armed, uniformed guard at Sachsenhausen concentration camp 
patrolling outside camp gates and escorting prisoners to and from 
work sites with orders to shoot assisted in persecution under the 
Act); United States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374, 1377 n.3 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986) (prisoner of war who 
was recruited to serve as a camp guard at Treblinka assisted in 
persecution); United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1382 
n.43 (N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982) (same). 
 
 B. 
            Given Fedorenko's guiding principles and upon our 
careful examination of the record, we find that the district 
court correctly concluded that Breyer assisted in the persecution 
  
of persons as contemplated by section 13 of the Displaced Persons 
Act.  The undisputed facts of record establish that Nazi 
concentration camps were places where suffering and harm was 
inflicted upon tens of thousands of innocent persons and that 
Breyer furthered Nazi military, political and social aims.  The 
record is uncontroverted that he was a trained, paid, uniformed 
armed Nazi guard who patrolled the perimeters of two such camps 
with orders to shoot those who tried to escape.  The prisoners he 
guarded and prevented from fleeing were oppressed, brutalized and 
killed for no other reason than their race, national origin or 
religion.  It is therefore beyond dispute that Breyer assisted in 
persecution within the meaning of section 13 and, therefore, was 
excluded from the Act's intended scope.   
 We next consider whether Breyer's service as a member 
of the SS Totenkopf constitutes membership or involvement in a 
movement hostile to the United States under section 13 of the 
Act, and are firmly persuaded that it does.  Indeed, the 
Displaced Persons Commission considered the SS Totenkopf to be 
such a movement.  See Interoffice Memorandum U.S. Displaced 
Persons Commission Headquarters Frankfurt Instruction Memo No. 
242, dated November 12, 1951.  Significantly, at Auschwitz, the 
SS Totenkopf committed atrocities against the Polish people who 
were United States allies.  Accordingly, we agree with the 
district court that Breyer's affiliation with the SS Totenkopf 
also excluded him from the benefits of the Act.  See United 
States v. Koziy, 728 F.2d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 835 (1984) (individual's membership in the Organization 
  
of Ukrainian Nationalists during World War II constituted 
membership in an organization hostile to the United States under 
section 13 of the Displaced Persons Act inasmuch as the 
Commission listed it as such and its members terrorized United 
States allies).  
 As in Fedorenko, where the Court sustained the 
revocation of the defendant's naturalization once it found that 
he was ineligible under the Displaced Persons Act, 419 U.S. at 
418-19, a determination that section 13 of the Act precluded 
Breyer from obtaining a visa leads inexorably to the conclusion 
that Breyer's naturalization was properly revoked.  See also 
Schmidt, 923 F.2d at 1253; Kairys, 782 F.2d at 1374, Demjanjuk, 
680 F.2d at 32.  When Breyer filed his petition for 
naturalization, the Immigration and Nationality Act required 
lawful admission to the United States, which in turn required a 
valid visa.  To gain admittance, Breyer used a visa obtained 
under the Displaced Persons Act.  Because of Breyer's wartime 
activities, however, the Displaced Persons Act excluded him from 
coverage.  As the visa Breyer presented upon entry was invalid, 
his admission into this country was unlawful.  Therefore, his 
naturalization was illegally procured under section 1451 as a 
matter of law, and the district court did not err in granting 
summary judgment and in ordering the cancellation of Breyer's 




 In contesting the district court's decision to grant 
summary judgment to the government and thereby denaturalize him, 
Breyer did not raise any fact dispute, or for that matter, take 
issue with the district court's conclusions of law.  Instead, he 
advanced his entitlement to derivative citizenship as a complete 
defense to the government's case.  Breyer contended that the 
district court erred in not declaring him a United States citizen 
through his mother, and asserted that had his citizenship been 
declared, the government's case would have necessarily failed for 
failure to establish that he entered the United States 
unlawfully.  Breyer also asserted that his derivative citizenship 
rendered the legality of his naturalization moot. 
 Acceptance of Breyer's mootness argument, however, 
would relieve him of accountability for the illegality in an 
essential element of the process that he chose to pursue for 
naturalization.  That Breyer may be a citizen of this country 
through some other means does not alter his ineligibility under 
the Displaced Persons Act or validate his visa and 1952 entry and 
should not nullify the government's right under section 1451(a) 
to require the surrender of a certificate of naturalization to 
which Breyer is not entitled or negate the practical significance 
of our determining whether he may continue to assert the status 
of "naturalized United States citizen", a privilege he has 
enjoyed for over thirty-five years.   
 More importantly, Congress has set forth the method by 
which one asserting derivative citizenship may have it declared.  
The Immigration and Nationality Act requires that a person with 
  
such a claim initially apply to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service for a Certificate of Citizenship.  8 
U.S.C. § 1452(a); 8 C.F.R. § 341.1-.7 (1994).9  If the applicant 
is denied a certificate, he or she may then initiate a 
declaratory judgment action in federal court under section 
1503(a)10 requesting a judicial declaration of citizenship.  As 
                     
9
.   Section 1452 provides in pertinent part: 
 
 § 1452.  Certificates of citizenship or U.S. non-
citizen national status; procedure            
 
 (a) A person who claims to have derived 
United States citizenship through the 
naturalization of a parent or through the 
naturalization or citizenship of a husband, 
or who is a citizen of the United States by 
virtue of the provisions of section 1993 of 
the United States Revised Statutes . . . may 
apply to the [Service] for a certificate of 
citizenship.  Upon proof to the satisfaction 
of the [Service] that the applicant is a 
citizen, and that the applicant's alleged 
citizenship was derived as claimed, or 
acquired, as the case may be, and upon taking 
and subscribing before a member of the 
Service within the United States to the oath 
of allegiance required by this chapter of an 
applicant for naturalization, such individual 
shall be furnished by the [Service] with a 
certificate of citizenship . . . . 
10
.   Section 1503(a) states in pertinent part: 
 
 § 1503.  Denial of rights and privileges as national 
 
 (a) If any person who is within the United States        
claims a right or privilege as a national of the         
United States and is denied such right or privilege      
by any department or independent agency, or official     
thereof, upon the ground that he is not a national of    
the United States, such person may institute an          
action under the provisions of section 2201 of Title     
28 against the head of such department or independent    
agency of a judgment declaring him to be a national      
  
section 1503(a) expressly requires a "final administrative 
denial" before any such action may be instituted, a federal 
district court does not have jurisdiction to declare citizenship 
absent exhaustion of an applicant's administrative remedies.  
Whitehead v. Haig, 794 F.2d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 Breyer relies upon United States v. Schiffer, 798 F. 
Supp. 1128 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd without opinion, 31 F.3d 1175, 
(3d Cir. 1994), to support his assertion that his derivative 
citizenship claim was properly before the district court as a 
complete defense to the government's case.11  We find, however, 
that Schiffer is inapposite.  There the government filed a 
section 1451(a) complaint against Nickolas Schiffer in which it 
admitted that Schiffer was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  
This admission established that Schiffer was a United States 
citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United Sates 
Constitution.  Schiffer filed a motion to dismiss the 
government's complaint, asserting that whether he had lost his 
(..continued) 
of the United States . . . . An action under this 
subsection may be instituted only within five years 
after the final administrative denial of such right or 
privilege and shall be filed in the district court of 
the United States. . . .  (emphasis added). 
11
.   In Schiffer, we affirmed the district court by judgment 
order.  Thus, this case does not have precedential value, except 
for the parties involved.  Airco Indus. Gases, Inc. v. Teamsters 
Health and Welfare Pension Fund, 850 F.2d 1028, 1030 & n.1 (3d 
Cir. 1988); Internal Operating Procedures of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Chapter 6.A.1.a (a 
judgment order is entered "[w]hen the panel unanimously 
determines . . . that a written opinion would have no 
precedential or institutional value. . . ."). 
  
original United States birth citizenship pursuant to a 
Certificate of Loss of Nationality that had previously been 
issued ex parte by the Department of State was an issue in the 
case.  In these circumstances, where Schiffer's constitutional 
right to United States citizenship had been admitted by the 
government and the complaint sought to revoke a status 
safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment and outside the reach of 
Congress, the district court determined that the issue of 
Schiffer's birth citizenship which had already been subject to 
attack, should be heard.  Schiffer, 798 F. Supp. at 1133.  
Because Breyer, with allegations of statutory derivative 
citizenship in a straightforward denaturalization action, 
presents a far different case, Schiffer does not apply.   
 Alternatively, Breyer argues that had his derivative 
citizenship been declared, the government's prima facie section 
1451(a) case would have failed because the government could not 
sustain its burden of proving that he entered the United States 
in alien status.  Section 1451(a), however, does not require such 
proof.  Even if it did, in his answer to the government's 
complaint, Breyer admitted that he applied for immigration and 
alien registration and entered the United States as a permanent 
resident and refugee.   
 We conclude that the district court exceeded its 
jurisdiction in considering the question of Breyer's derivative 
citizenship.  The district court had before it a narrow section 
1451(a) case in which it was called upon only to decide whether 
each step that Breyer took toward naturalization was proper.  
  
Breyer's derivative citizenship claim was separate and distinct 
from, and had no bearing on, the government's denaturalization 
case.  Significantly, in permitting Breyer to proceed with his 
derivative citizenship claim, the district court reached a 
constitutional issue that was unnecessary to its holding.  In 
doing so, the district court disregarded a fundamental and 
longstanding principle of judicial restraint which requires that 
courts "avoid reaching constitutional issues in advance of the 
necessity of deciding them."  Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass'n., 485 U.S. 439, 445-46 (1988).  Accordingly, 
Breyer's derivative citizenship claim should not have been 
considered, and those orders of the district court which relate 
to this issue will be vacated.   
 
 IV. 
 Lastly, Breyer raises as error the district court's 
denial of his motion to stay the government's denaturalization 
action until final resolution of his pending administrative 
derivative citizenship proceeding.  The power to stay is 
incidental to the power inherent in every court to dispose of 
cases so as to promote their fair and efficient adjudication.  
Gold, 723 F.2d at 1077.  Absent an abuse of discretion, a 
district court's decision in this regard will not be overturned.  
A stay is an extraordinary measure and Breyer failed to offer any 
compelling reasons for its issuance.  Therefore, we will uphold 
the district court's decision denying Breyer a stay as within the 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's grant of summary judgment on Counts I and II of the 
complaint in the government's favor, and its orders revoking and 
setting aside the order admitting Breyer to citizenship and 
canceling and demanding the surrender of Breyer's certificate of 
naturalization.  We will vacate those portions of the district 
court's orders relating to Breyer's derivative citizenship claim. 
